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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, following failed labor negotiations and facing a
mounting budget crisis, the Oakland, California, Police Department
fired eighty police officers and announced that it would no longer
respond to reports of certain crimes, including burglary, vandalism,
†
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1

theft, and a host of low-level offenses. Oakland is not the only community to have limited—or considered limiting—police services in
response to local budget woes. Cities across the country—small and
large, urban and suburban—have been forced to scale back the size of
their police forces. While some have joined Oakland in explicitly pair2
ing budget cuts with service cuts, others have vowed to redouble their
efforts to stretch scarce resources even further. Upon assuming office,
for example, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel asked his police chief to
3
freeze hiring and cut $190 million from his budget. Emanuel, however,
assured an anxious public that he “remain[ed] committed to putting
more officers on the streets,” insisting that the budget cuts would
4
come from the central office bureaucracy. Currently, the Chicago
5
Police Department has over 1400 unfilled positions.
For obvious reasons, reductions in police force size and service
levels raise serious questions about public safety, especially in major
cities. These reductions also bring to the surface questions about
policing priorities, including the debate over so-called “ordermaintenance policing” policies, which have, over the past few decades,
refocused police resources on restoring order in urban public spaces
6
following years of relative neglect. An important catalyst for this “ordermaintenance revolution” was the 1982 publication of James Q. Wilson
and George Kelling’s influential essay, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, which urged urban leaders to reassert authority
7
over, and restore order to, urban public spaces. But it is fair to say
that, by the time Wilson and Kelling published Broken Windows, many
1

See, e.g., Lori Preuitt & Kris Sanchez, Suffer These Crimes in Oakland? Don’t Call the
Cops, NBC BAY AREA ( July 13, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/
local/Suffer-These-Crimes-in-Oakland-Dont-Call-the-Cops-98266509.html (providing a
par-tial list of the forty-four situations to which Oakland police will no longer respond).
2
Kevin Johnson, Home Burglarized? Fill Out a Form; Cutbacks Force Police to Curtail
Calls for Some Crimes, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010, at 1A.
3
Emanuel Vows Police Budget Cuts Won’t Hurt Safety, CBS CHI. (Aug. 31, 2011, 2:48 PM),
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/08/31/emanuel-vows-police-budget-cuts-wont-hurtsafety.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 9-17 (2009) (recounting the history of the “ordermaintenance revolution”).
7
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 29-38.
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Americans had already concluded that the “comedy of the commons”
was not funny anymore. A dramatic decline in decorum in urban public spaces—combined with an equally dramatic economic disinvestment in American cities—led to disillusionment with the laissez-faire
approach to public space management that had dominated urban pol9
icy since the 1960s. Moreover, a colorable case can be made that the
renewed attention to the quality of life in urban public spaces helped
10
spur the unexpected urban resurgence of the past few decades.
At least since the publication of Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article The
11
Tragedy of the Commons, most policymakers and social scientists have
assumed that resources held in common—including the urban com12
mons of sidewalks, streets, and parks—are doomed to exploitation.
These same social scientists and policymakers also have become sharply
divided over how to prevent the commons from descending into tragedy. Some join Hardin in asserting that centralized, governmental con13
trol of the commons is necessary. Others argue that privatization is
the simplest and most effective way to avoid the tragedy of the com8

Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986). The “comedy of the commons” postulates
that defining certain property as “public” could create “infinite ‘returns to scale’” and
create wealth for all. Id.
9
See GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 70-108 (1996) (discussing the collapse of laissez-faire policing strategies); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165,
1209-17 (1996) (discussing the causes and effects of deregulation of urban public spaces).
10
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1286-93 (2006) (arguing that urban resurgence is
attributable in part to increasing demand for the consumer amenities and opportunity
for social interactions that cities provide).
11
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
12
See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 57, 60 (2011) (“The quality of a neighborhood commons—of its street life,
sidewalks, open spaces, and public parks—might begin to decline through increasing
demands by different users and uses of the space.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to
Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 364 (2010) (noting that cities do not typically leave
dumpsters near urban parks or sidewalks because it will invite people to abuse the
dumpsters and dispose of their negative-value assets in them).
13
This view pervades the literature on environmental regulation. See, e.g., WILLIAM
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 148-52 (1977) (linking commons
theory in the environmental context to the work of Thomas Hobbes); George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary Case against Devolved Collaboration,
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602, 604 (1999) (reaffirming the need for a strong governmental role
in natural resource management).
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mons because (to borrow from Henry Smith) exclusion is a more
14
effective means of resource management than governance. But in
recent years, economists and property theorists, led most prominently
by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, have challenged the axiomatic proposition that the commons inevitably descends into tragedy or that “un15
owned” property is doomed to overuse. While Ostrom’s work suggests
that cooperative management of common-pool resources is not only
possible but also can arise organically, other scholars have emphasized
the undertheorized and underappreciated benefits of shared ownership. For example, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller’s 2001 article,
The Liberal Commons, demonstrated that joint ownership arrangements,
with elements of both private and commons property, can have signifi16
cant benefits over individual ownership.
Over the past several decades, discussions about the appropriate
tools of commons management have played out in a particularly illuminating way in policy debates about the management of urban public
spaces. Urban public spaces are not a pure commons per se, as they
have owners (i.e., local governments). However, political and constitutional limitations placed on those owners dramatically curtail the
extent to which they control those spaces, resulting in streets, parks,
and sidewalks very strongly resembling commons. These public-space
management discussions tend to map themselves neatly onto theoretical debates about commons resource management. Some commenta17
tors urge, à la Hardin, that government coercion is needed to restore
14

See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467 (2002) (arguing that governance and exclusion are the two extremes of a spectrum of rules with different types of property rights
falling between them).
15
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1990) (arguing that individuals in a commons are
not “inevitably caught in a trap from which they cannot escape” and insisting that the
ability to avoid a tragedy of the commons “varies from situation to situation”) (emphasis omitted); see also John Tierney, The Non-Tragedy of the Commons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2009, 12:41 PM), http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/the-non-tragedy-ofthe-commons (arguing both that “too often . . . commons ended up in worse shape
once they were put under the control of distant bureaucrats,” and, based on Ostrom’s
research, that a lack of government interference can actually preserve resources).
16
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
581-87 (2001) (maintaining that the cooperation, room for autonomy, and right to exit
inherent in an “ideal” liberal commons produce less overuse, underinvestment, and
waste than individual ownership).
17
See Hardin, supra note 11, at 1247 (extolling the virtues of coercion).
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order to the urban commons: Broken Windows is of this ilk, as are por18
tions of Robert Ellickson’s work on public-space zoning. Others urge
the privatization of urban public spaces to transform them into some19
thing akin to Dagan and Heller’s “liberal commons.”
On the ground in American cities, these theoretical arguments
have been translated into concrete policies, including policing strategies (for example, order-maintenance and community policing) and
urban development strategies (for example, business improvement districts (BIDs)). The former clearly instantiates the view that successful
commons management depends on government coercion, and the
latter represents a conviction that the quasi privatization of the commons is advisable. While, legally, the management of urban common
spaces remains the purview of the police, quasi-privatization mechanisms such as BIDs also perform public-space management functions,
especially the funding of infrastructure improvements and supplemental public services. The much celebrated (and debated) urban rebound of the past two decades suggests that this compromise has been
partially successful, insofar as success is measured by a resurgent urban
20
population base and the renewal of central-city neighborhoods.

18

See Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1220-22 (proposing a hypothetical system
of red, yellow, and green zoning—with each zone governed by a different degree of
government intervention—in order to ban or allow activities, such as panhandling and
bench squatting).
19
Dagan & Heller, supra note 16; see also Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old
Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 87-88 (1998) (urging the creation of “Neighborhood
Improvement Districts” as a “mandatory-membership organization of property owners”
empowered to decide distribution of public goods within the neighborhood); Robert
H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective
Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (arguing
that state governments should pass legislation to “allow self-governance [by neighborhood
associations] in these neighborhoods, through new collective private ownerships”).
20
See, e.g., Patrick A. Simmons & Robert E. Lang, The Urban Turnaround (analyzing
the urban population increase in thirty-six U.S. cities throughout the 1990s), in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA 51, 51 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds.,
2003); Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, Downtown Rebound (contending that,
while most central cities are “losing population to their surrounding metropolitan
area, . . . most downtowns within those central cities are gaining a larger share of metropolitan statistical area population”), in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA:
EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, supra, at 63, 63; see also Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 10,
at 1288-93 (arguing that the urban resurgence since the 1980s was caused by falling
crime rates, rising income, and a higher demand for amenities like museums and restaurants). But cf. Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Econom-

Garnett Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2000

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

5/30/2012 7:56 PM

[Vol. 160: 1995

This is an opportune time to reexamine the commons-management
questions raised by these policies. As this Article’s opening anecdote
suggests, the current economic crisis is forcing cities to scale back law
enforcement efforts, and it is limiting the financing available to fund
sublocal investments in urban public spaces. It is possible that these
pressures will lead the current urban-commons compromise to unravel,
resulting in less public regulation of urban public spaces, more pressure for private regulation, or both. Using these tensions as a starting
point, this Article will draw upon the literature on commons-space
management from multiple disciplines—especially law, economics,
and sociology—to reflect critically upon the optimal regulation of urban public spaces and the possibility of cooperative commons management arising in the absence of government regulation.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly outlines the
commons debate. It focuses particularly on arguments that either
coercive regulation or privatization is necessary for efficient commons
management and on Ostrom’s work suggesting that cooperative
management regimes may arise organically. Part I also argues that the
lessons from the literature can be fruitfully applied to the question of
urban public-space management. Part II describes the evolution of
the regulation of the urban commons, with an emphasis on the
connections between these theoretical arguments and urban policy
innovations in recent decades. Drawing upon legal and social science
literatures, Part III analyzes whether greater privatization or cooperative management of urban public spaces is advisable or possible. The
Article concludes by asking whether the lessons of urban space management can be exported to questions of commons management in
other contexts.
I. THE URBAN COMMONS “PROBLEM”
In his influential 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett
Hardin argued that coercive government regulation is necessary to
prevent the degradation of common-pool resources, because individual
resource appropriators receive the full benefit of their use and bear

ic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 323-31 (2010) (challenging the assumption that
redevelopment efforts are causally linked to the urban resurgence).
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only a share of their cost. Analogizing to game theory, the tragedy of
22
the commons is a prisoner’s dilemma. Since no individual has the
right to control or exclude others, each appropriator has a very high
discount rate and little incentive to efficiently manage the resource in
order to guarantee future use. In Hardin’s words,
[T]herein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels
him to increase his [use] without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best in23
terest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.

Hardin’s conclusion that coercive, centralized government regulation
represents the only way to avoid tragic overuse of commons resources
is embedded in many concrete public policies, including environmental regulations and many of the order-maintenance policies reviewed
24
below.
In contrast, the conventional wisdom among many economists and
legal scholars holds that privatization, not regulation, is the most effective solution to the problem of the commons. The stylized and elegant
version of the argument, set forth in the work of Harold Demsetz, suggests that privatization internalizes the costs of resource appropriation,
25
thereby creating incentives to use resources more efficiently. Subsequent commentators have refined Demsetz’s account. Robert Ellickson emphasizes the benefits of privatization for resource uses with
small and medium geographic effects, but questions whether regula26
Henry Smith
tion may be necessary to police larger-scale effects.
highlights the benefits of the exclusion right (a central tenet of private
property ownership) over other governance-based methods of resource
21

Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244. This was not an original insight. See, e.g.,
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 2, ch. 1, § 10 ( Jeffrey Henderson ed., H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1944) (“Property that is common to the greatest number of
owners receives the least attention . . . .”); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954) (“Wealth that is
free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper
time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.”).
22
See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 3-5.
23
Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244.
24
See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12-13 (reviewing literature regarding privatization
as a policy alternative to avoid the tragedy of the commons).
25
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than cost of internalization.”).
26
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-35 (1993).
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management; exclusion, he argues, is a low-cost way of preventing
resource dissipation—at least when the costs of parcelization and risks
27
of incursion are relatively low.
A. Cooperative Commons Management:
Preconditions and Benefits
The classic regulation–privatization dichotomy has been refined
and challenged numerous times, including, most influentially, by Elinor
28
Ostrom, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. In
her classic book, Governing the Commons, Ostrom documents several
examples of longstanding common-pool resource regimes that have
succeeded with neither privatization nor pervasive centralized regula29
tion. Ostrom argues that effective appropriation strategies can arise,
even among heterogeneous appropriators, under certain conditions,
including shared norms of appropriation, delineation of the universe
of permitted appropriators, congruence between the appropriation
rules and local conditions, effective monitoring by accountable indi30
viduals, and clearly defined boundaries. Ostrom calls into question
the efficacy of external attempts to regulate resources characterized by
these conditions. Indeed, she argues that some of the institutional failures that she has studied result from ill advised central regulation that
31
displaces or disregards preexisting cooperative regulatory regimes.
Ostrom’s optimism is not unbounded. She does not suggest that
all communities will achieve optimal commons regulation without
government intervention. On the contrary, the successful commons27

See Smith, supra note 14, at S475-77 (arguing that because exclusion “prevents
the ‘rest of the world’ from undertaking many uses,” it represents a more cost-efficient
alternative to having to “contract with every possible invader”).
28
Louis Uchitelle, 2 U.S. Social Scientists Share Nobel in Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2009, at B1.
29
In some cases, these regimes have existed for over half a millennium. See OSTROM,
supra note 15, at 62-65 (discussing the formal establishment of an association to achieve
regulation over the use of common resources in Törbel, Switzerland, in Feburary
1483); id. at 69-82 (discussing the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, which date back to
at least the mid-fifteenth century).
30
Id. at 90-101.
31
In one example, residents of a Sri Lankan fishing village had agreed upon an
elaborate set of appropriation rules regulating when particular residents’ nets would be
used to catch fish. When later legislation codified “criteria for allocating access to the
water,” it led to a breakdown of the formerly-agreed-upon rules and, arguably, an unfair distribution of the returns from fishing. Id. at 149-57.
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management regimes that she describes all depend on government
enforcement to some extent. Some of them are effectively governmental:
that is, they exercise authority akin to limited-purpose local govern32
ments. At least some of her examples, like the special water districts
of Southern California, actually are special purpose local governments. It follows that Ostrom’s characterization of these districts as
cooperative is somewhat odd, given that they developed as a result of
33
litigation spanning more than a decade.
Moreover, as Dagan and Heller observe, Ostrom’s success stories
all depend upon limitations on rights of alienation, in order to pre34
serve continuity among the pool of appropriators. Dagan and Heller
criticize Ostrom and her allies for failing to “consider that the price of
their commons successes—which require locking people together in
static communities—may be too dear, particularly for those who place
35
a high value on individual liberty.” They build a case for property
regimes that not only preserve the right of exit, but also capture the
benefits of shared resources through internal governance mecha36
37
nisms. This “liberal commons” (or “governance property”) is, in
Carol Rose’s words, “commons on the inside, property on the out38
side.” That is, the resource in question is not a pure commons, open
to all, but rather is owned by a finite number of people who manage
and exclude outsiders from its use. Dagan and Heller argue that such
regimes—which, under their taxonomy, include marital property, condominiums, partnerships, and close corporations—are “ideal” modes of

32

Id. at 58-88 (discussing forestry and irrigation regimes). On special purpose
local governments, see RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 269-77 (7th ed. 2009). See also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 367-70
(1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a property-based voting scheme that governed a local entity in charge of delivering untreated water and selling electricity to
hundreds of thousands of people in Arizona); OSTROM, supra note 15, at 129-36 (discussing the process for forming groundwater districts).
33
See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 111-26 (discussing the groundwater litigation in
Southern California).
34
Dagan & Heller, supra note16, at 566.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 553.
37
In this Symposium, Gregory Alexander refers to these forms of ownership as
“governance property.” See generally Gregory Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. #### (2012).
38
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
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organization that “enable[] a limited group of owners to capture the
economic and social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource,
while also ensuring autonomy to individual members who retain a
39
secure right to exit.”
B. Urban Public Space as a Commons
Dagan and Heller’s work also illuminates a central problem in discussions of commons regulation—namely, the lumping together of
unowned resources (true commons) with those that are owned by limited groups of people who exercise rights of both governance and exclusion (their “liberal commons” examples, as well as, arguably, the
common pool resources Ostrom studied). Obviously, effective management of a true open-access resource is far more difficult than
management of a “liberal commons,” as no individual or group of
individuals has the right to exclude others from using a resource.
Additionally, the fact that many resources commonly considered to be
held “in common” (e.g., national parks and forests) are actually state40
owned further complicates the taxonomic difficulties plaguing
41
discussions of commons management tools.
Before beginning a discussion of urban public spaces as a
commons problem, it is necessary to make the case that urban public
spaces are commons. In the technical legal sense, they arguably are
not. Local governments own most city streets, sidewalks, and parks,
either outright or as public easements that encumber the fee simple
titles of abutting property owners. These local governments manage
these assets and assert their ownership rights in various ways. For example, parks are frequently off-limits after dark; protestors, paraders,
and street vendors must secure permits; traffic regulations are ubiquitous; and entire streets may be closed for any number of reasons (for
example, routine repairs, enabling neighborhood festivals, assuring
42
the safety of paraders or runners, or promoting urban development).
39

Dagan & Heller, supra note 16, at 553.
See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 40 (1988) (defining stateowned resources as “collective property”).
41
The public trust doctrine even further complicates the reality of a pure commons
concept. See generally, e.g., Michael Seth Benn, Comment, Towards Environmental Entrepreneurship: Restoring the Public Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (2006).
42
For example, in the summer of 2011, New York City closed thirteen underused
street segments in areas such as the South Bronx for several hours a day to create “play
40
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That said, the scope of a local government’s “ownership” rights
over the urban commons is far less extensive than, say, the federal
government’s rights over the national parks, forests, and military bases.
A long string of Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of public space regulation has dramatically curtailed local gov43
ernments’ control over appropriators of urban public space. While
the precedential weight of many of these Warren Court–era decisions
44
has been limited by subsequent rulings, these cases continue to dra45
matically limit local governments’ rights of exclusion and governance.
The First Amendment protects expressive activity in public spaces,
although a local government may impose content-neutral, reasonable
46
time, place, and manner restrictions on it. The vagueness doctrine
dramatically curtails the degree of discretion a city can vest in police
47
And other constitutional docofficers to regulate public spaces.

streets,” which “created an atmosphere like a block party, except the play streets were
devoted to exercising . . . .” Blair Kamin, How to Correct Chicago’s Open Space Shortage: 10
Ideas That Could Help City’s Park-Poor Neighborhoods Away from the Lakefront, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 14, 2011, 10:30:06 PM), http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/theskyline/2011/
0/how-to-correct-chicagos-open-space-shortage-10-ideas-that-could-help-citys-park-poorneighborhoods-a.html.
43
See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165, 171 (1972) (invalidating a city vagrancy ordinance on due process–related grounds and suggesting that
the Constitution protects the right to “loaf”); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-35
(1968) (upholding a prohibition of public drunkenness, but questioning whether such
laws might be invalid criminalizations of “a mere status”).
44
See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure—Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1167
(1998) (showing that many Warren Court–era standards now frustrate the policies designed to fix social problems that had been identified by the Warren Court); Stephen
F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left?: Judicial Activism on the Right, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 57, 62 (2002) (noting the Rehnquist Court’s retrenchment from the Warren
Court’s constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence).
45
In contrast to the criminal sphere, the scope of a local government’s authority
over economic regulations—including regulations of public spaces such as limits on
street vending—is broad because such government decisions are subject to rational basis
review. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 107-09 (1949) (giving great deference to local legislators in regards to laws governing public advertising).
46
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1127 (3d ed. 2006) (summarizing permissible restrictions on speech in public fora).
47
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (citing “too much discretion to the police” and “too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets” as
reasons for striking down an antigang ordinance for vagueness).
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trines—including the right to travel, freedom of association, and the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish50
ment —limit local governments’ abilities to exclude individuals, including excessive or irresponsible appropriators, from the urban
commons. This reality was highlighted in 2002, when the Sixth Circuit
invalidated a Cincinnati ordinance banning persons previously arrested
for drug offenses from the “public streets, sidewalks, and other public
51
ways” of any designated “drug-exclusion zone[].” The City of Cincinnati argued that the ordinance was necessary to restore order in
52
neighborhoods plagued by drugs. The court, however, ruled that the
ordinance violated the excluded individuals’ First Amendment rights
53
of association. Other lower courts have invalidated ordinances im54
55
posing juvenile curfews, penalizing aggressive panhandling, and
56
prohibiting sleeping in public places, on a variety of constitutional
grounds. And, as Carol Rose has argued, our legal tradition has long
treated certain kinds of public spaces, including roads, as “inherently
57
public.”

48

See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a juvenile curfew on right-to-travel grounds).
49
See, e.g., Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 08-2429, 2012
WL 947008, at *9-15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012) (affirming a jury finding that a resolution
that attempted to evict the Boy Scouts from a city-owned building for violating a municipal nondiscrimination law violated the group’s right to expressive association).
50
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a law criminalizing sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets or sidewalks violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment), vacated,
505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
51
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Id. at 502.
53
Id. at 505-06.
54
E.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940-44 (9th Cir. 1997).
55
See Loper v. NYPD, 999 F.2d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1993) (invalidating an antipanhandling statute on freedom of speech grounds); Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v.
City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same), vacated in part,
966 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (approving a stipulated settlement repealing the
offending ordinance).
56
See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(enjoining Miami’s “pattern and practice of arresting homeless people for the purpose
of driving them from public areas” on Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, due
process, and right-to-travel grounds).
57
See Rose, supra note 8, at 770-71 (connecting the public nature of roads to
national economic development).
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In other words, although urban public spaces are not unowned,
they are effectively open-access and are thus much closer to a pure
commons than either Ostrom’s common-pool resource regimes or
Dagan and Heller’s “liberal commons.” As Ellickson has observed, the
open-access nature of urban public spaces makes them “classic sites for
58
tragedy.” And many of our cities’ public spaces indeed descended
into tragedy in the middle decades of the twentieth century, when outof-control crime rates and pervasive disorder became expected, and
many Americans simply chose to avoid the urban commons whenever
59
possible.
II. URBAN PUBLIC-SPACE MANAGEMENT:
A SHORT EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
Nothing about the condition of urban public spaces in the early
1980s lent itself to optimism. Public authorities essentially had abandoned the task of managing the urban commons. Moreover, urban
public spaces had none of the characteristics that Ostrom suggests
would make them amenable to cooperative regulation: they were not
60
“property on the outside, commons on the inside.” They had neither
clearly defined boundaries nor a stable, limited pool of appropriators.
Frequent appropriators had no legal right to exclude outsiders or to
sanction those who violated accepted norms of appropriation. Since
anyone could appropriate the commons at any time, without restriction,
classical economic theory would have predicted a rush to the resource,
with each appropriator seeking to maximize the benefit of the appropriation before the depletion of the resource by others. Theoretically,
the lack of a right to exclude dramatically increases the likelihood that
61
the commons would become tragic. Yet, to the surprise of many,
order has been restored to the urban commons over the last few
decades—thanks in large part to the confluence of two distinct policy

58

Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 152 (2000) (“Out-of-control crime was the nearly universal expectation for the inner city. Any other positive trend there . . . was sharply
hemmed in by the prospect of continued crime and, just as important, an all-butunshakable fear of crime.”).
60
Rose, supra note 38, at 155.
61
See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 34-35 (summarizing the nature of collective-action
problems).
59
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developments that represent opposite poles in the debate over what
constitute appropriate tools for commons-space management.
A. The Re-Regulation of the Urban Commons
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the governance of
urban public spaces—in commons-regulation terms, the control of
public-space appropriators—was the primary focus for municipal
police forces. Laws criminalizing vagrancy, loitering, and public drunkenness gave police officers vast discretion in deciding whether to arrest
62
individuals for breaches of the peace. While most order-maintenance
63
efforts were undoubtedly informal, the availability of legal sanctions
for breaches of the public order provided an important back up to
64
informal order-maintenance efforts. Indeed, prior to the “constitutional revolution” of the late 1960s, a large number of arrests were for
65
public-order offenses. Unfortunately, the old commons-regulation
regime frequently targeted minorities and the poor, resulting in un66
even and discriminatory enforcement, while the legal system often

62

See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 595 (1997) (“Many
citizens were rendered almost perpetually subject to arrest pursuant to catchall vagrancy
laws.”); William J. Stuntz, Crime Talk and Law Talk, 23 REVS. AM. HIST. 153, 157 (1995)
(reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1993)) (“Prior to the 1960s, vagrancy and loitering laws made it possible for police to
arrest pretty much anyone . . . .”).
63
See JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 31 (1968) (explaining that the patrolman “approaches incidents that threaten order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of
‘handling the situation’”) (emphasis removed).
64
See Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV.
699, 702-03 (1967); Wilson & Kelling, supra note 7, at 35 (arguing that society can benefit when police have “the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed”).
65
See HOWARD M. BAHR, SKID ROW: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISAFFILIATION 227-28
(1973) (recounting statistics showing that, during the 1960s, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy accounted for a substantial percentage of arrests).
66
See, e.g., David Cole, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure—Foreword:
Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship,
87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1999) (asserting that the police’s “abuse of the criminal law to
reinforce racial subordination” influenced the Court’s rulings in the 1950s and 1960s);
Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1209 (noting that public-order laws “had long been disproportionately enforced against poor people and members of racial minorities”).
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turned a blind eye to the myriad injustices perpetrated in the name of
67
public order.
Disillusionment with traditional methods of controlling the conduct of public-space appropriators eventually led to the deregulation
of urban public spaces. The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution” accelerated this deregulation, but these changes also were in
keeping with modern policing theory, which held that “on the beat”
enforcement of public-order crimes served little purpose and spawned
68
corruption, unequal enforcement, and public resentment. By the
early 1970s, reforms downplaying officers’ role as public-space regulators had largely eliminated the public-order enforcement regime.69
The costs of local governments’ decisions to abandon the urban
commons management role quickly became apparent, as crime rates
rose despite burgeoning law enforcement budgets, and chaos seemed
70
to take hold in many urban public spaces. Thus, by the time Broken
Windows was published in 1982, rising crime rates—and fear of crime
and urban disorder—had laid the groundwork for new experimentation with “old-fashioned” order-management strategies. These orderrestoration strategies have generated two heated academic debates:
The first of these debates concerns the core claim of the so-called
“broken windows” hypothesis, which posits that disorder causes
71
crime. The second concerns the civil-liberties risks implicated by the
67

See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
604-09 (1956) (recounting judicial abuses during summary proceedings in the Philadelphia magistrates’ courts).
68
See KELLING & COLES supra note 9, at 73-74 (characterizing the reputation of the
police before progressive reforms took hold as one of “brutality, inefficiency, and corruption”).
69
See generally id. at 80-85 (reviewing the history of police reform); Livingston, supra
note 62, at 565-68 (describing the professionalization—and simultaneous retreat from
neighborhood policing—of the police, from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s).
70
See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 9, at 85-89 (describing the collapse of
reform-era policing strategies); Livingston, supra note 62, at 568 (describing citizen and
political frustration with crime rates that began to rise rapidly during the 1960s).
71
See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990) (finding a causal connection between
disorder and robbery rates, specifically, that “[p]erceived crime problems, fear of
crime, and actual victimization all [are] limited to social and physical disorder” in a
given urban area); see also GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE
MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 6-9 (2001),
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf (attributing a dramatic
decline in crime in New York City to an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy); Hope
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vesting of the police with increased authority in managing public
72
spaces. Order-maintenance policies are both numerous and diverse.
Some policies, such as former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s
famous “quality of life” campaign and the anti-gang ordinance at issue
in City of Chicago v. Morales, directly target perceived “disorders”—gang
members, squeegeemen, turnstile jumpers, etc. In other words, these
policies reflect the assumption that coercive government regulation is
73
needed to control the commons. Other policies, especially ubiquitous “community policing” efforts, seek to build stronger relationships
between police officers and the citizens whom they have sworn to pro-

Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235, 256-59
(2005) (analyzing data from New York City and finding that an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy led to a decrease in incidents of violent crime). But see BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING
59-78 (2001) (challenging Skogan’s findings—“that neighborhood disorder had a statistically significant relationship with the level of robbery victimization”—and reinterpreting the data to show that no support exists for the broken windows hypothesis);
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 287-300 (2006) (casting doubt
on the accuracy of both the Kelling and Sousa and the Corman and Mocan New York
City studies); see also Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC.
603, 637-39 (1999) (finding that disorder was correlated with robbery in a Chicago
study, but questioning even a weak causal connection between disorder and other serious
crime).
72
See generally URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES
(Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) (containing essays by authors—
including Margaret Burnham, Alan Dershowitz, Carol Steiker, and Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan—engaging in a debate over the proper scope of police empowerment, as
contrasted with legal safeguards protecting individual rights); Kahan & Meares, supra
note 44, at 1159-71 (highlighting how the same inner-city minority communities that
fought aggressive community policing policies in the Civil Rights Era as tools of white
oppression now support such measures as tools for building safer neighborhoods). I
leave both of these debates to the side here, each for slightly different reasons. As for
the first, whether order-maintenance strategies effectively control crime is not on point,
since, the strategies are accepted to be no worse than the laissez-faire approaches they
recently supplanted. See HARCOURT, supra note 71, at 59-78 (finding no relationship
between community “disorder” and crime rates). As for the second, the risks of abuse
attendant to coercive government regulation are real, but they also extend far beyond
the realm of public-space regulation.
73
See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Police Announce Crackdown on Quality-of-Life Offenses,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at 33 (explaining that behind Giuliani’s campaign was “the
idea that leniency toward these minor infractions . . . raises fears and leads to greater
crimes”).
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tect.
They accomplish this both through policing techniques—for
example, foot and bike patrols—that ensure more frequent, informal
interactions and through solicitation of citizen input about policing
75
priorities.
Community policing practices are closely intertwined with ordermaintenance efforts for at least two reasons. First, foot and bike patrols maximize officers’ ability to monitor and control disorder and to
76
prevent serious crime before it occurs. Second, when citizens are
asked to help shape policing priorities, they frequently prioritize the
77
elimination of “prevalent and low-key troubles” —loitering, vandalism, prostitution, and street gangs: the public-space “disorder[s]” at
78
the heart of the order-maintenance agenda.
Community-policing
proponents argue that, by enlisting input from citizens regarding
police priorities, police can help reinforce appropriate norms of pub79
lic-space allocation and may also catalyze shifts in deviant norms. As
Ostrom emphasizes, shared norms of appropriation are critical to the
success of commons regulation because they take certain appropriation strategies off the table and limit the likelihood of opportunistic
80
behavior. In the open-access world of the urban commons, broadly
shared norms among repeat appropriators are particularly important.

74

See Livingston, supra note 62, at 563-64 (“In community policing, the community,
rather than police professionalism and the law, becomes a principal source of legitimation for many police efforts directed at ameliorating disorderly conditions.”).
75
See id. at 575-78 (describing the police tactics used under the community policing
umbrella).
76
See MICHAEL J. PALMIOTTO, COMMUNITY POLICING: A POLICE-CITIZEN PARTNERSHIP 99 (2011).
77
Livingston, supra note 62, at 578 (quoting DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE
FUTURE 106 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78
See id. at 573-78 (arguing that citizen input has “become synonymous with a particular new focus on the quality of life in public places”).
79
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1866-68 (1999) (focusing on the
utility of deputizing juveniles as private criminal law enforcers in order to “create an
environment in which juveniles can efficiently signal to each other their own contempt
for criminality” and therefore effectuate crime reduction); Tracey L. Meares & Kelsi
Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1315, 1360-61 (2007)
(concluding that police officers’ speaking to a community in approachable terms, such
as religious language, may facilitate communication and agreement between the community and the police).
80
OSTROM, supra note 15, at 35-57.
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B. The Partial Privatization of Public Spaces
During the period in which order-maintenance policies proliferated,
local governments also began to address public-space management
through partial private ordering. These reforms flow from a very different assumption than the order-maintenance efforts that accompany
them—namely, the neoclassical economic assumption that the simplest means of managing the commons is privatization, not coercive
81
regulation. These mechanisms—especially BIDs and, to a lesser ex82
tent, tax increment financing (TIF) —enable property owners in a
community to overcome the free-rider problems that plague voluntary
commons-management efforts. They do so primarily by vesting property owners with special powers of taxation and empowering them to
83
spend the revenues raised at the sublocal level.
BIDs are a ubiquitous element of the urban landscape. They also
are the clearest instantiation of the assumption that private ordering
should address the management problems plaguing the urban commons. Although BIDs trace their roots to the special assessment, a
mechanism for financing public infrastructure that has existed for
84
centuries, they did not exist in their current form before 1975, with

81

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers &
Proc.) 347 (1967).
82
I leave TIF to the side for present purposes, as it is fairly debatable whether it, in
fact, represents a privatization effort in the same way that BIDs do. TIF earmarks revenue growth within a sublocal territorial area (usually called a TIF district) for reinvestment within the area. While TIF funds are, like BID funds, frequently used for publicspace management (especially for investment in new public-space infrastructure),
property owners are not given any additional powers of taxation or formal rights of
governance as in the BID model. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 6769 (2010) (explaining the structure of TIF funds and discussing their relation to tax
laws); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 503, 512-14 (1997) (describing the operation of TIFs).
83
Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time: Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 409-14 (1999).
84
See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special
Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 204 (1983) (noting that
the first sustained American appearance of the special assessment occurred at the end
of the eighteenth century); cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 630 (3d ed. 2005) (“Special assessments appeared as early as 1250, when an English statute apportioned by acreage the costs of repairing a seawall around Romney
Marsh.”).

Garnett Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Managing the Urban Commons

5/30/2012 7:56 PM

2013
85

the vast majority of BIDs today being formed between 1990 and 2010.
While state and local laws authorizing the creation of BIDs and regulating their details vary significantly, most BIDs share a few core characteristics. BIDs are, broadly speaking, territorial subdivisions of a city
in which property owners are empowered to levy, and obligated to pay,
86
special assessments to fund supplemental public services. BIDs are
public-private hybrids and are perhaps best analogized to special pur87
pose local governments, but their day-to-day operations tend to be
88
managed by private, nonprofit corporations. Many statutes authorizing the creation of BIDs also authorize (or even require) cities to con89
Moreover, as
tract with these entities to manage BID operations.
Richard Briffault has observed, BIDs almost universally conceive of
themselves as private entities, rather than as arms of the local govern90
ment. BIDs also share some characteristics with the private residential
community associations that are ubiquitous in the suburban landscape,
including, notably, the fact that BID governance structures almost universally privilege property ownership—sometimes to the total exclu91
sion of residents who do not own property within a BID’s boundaries.
Unlike residential community associations, however, BIDs do not
92
generally exercise formal regulatory authority. BIDs’ functions vary
85

See Richard Briffault, The Business Improvement District Comes of Age, 3 DREXEL L.
REV. 19, 19 (2010) (stating that the first BID in the United States was the Downtown
Development District of New Orleans—established in 1975—and maintaining that
“2010 mark[ed] the completion of two decades of . . . the BID movement”).
86
See Richard Briffault, supra note 83, at 377-87 (providing an overview of the operation, formation, and legal background of BIDs).
87
Indeed, courts have relied on this analogy to reject constitutional challenges to
BID governance structures that favor property owners. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent.
Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that because a BID had
a “limited purpose” its management association was exempt from one-person, one-vote
requirements and that the “special purpose” government exception to equal suffrage
did not apply because the district’s activities did not “disproportionately affect narrow
classes of persons within the district”).
88
See Briffault, supra note 83, at 409-14 (discussing the governance functions of
BIDs and explaining that “[b]usinesspeople, especially landowners, generally dominate
the membership of the BIDs’ managing boards”).
89
Id. at 409-14.
90
Id. at 410.
91
Id. at 412-13 (explaining that boards of BID administrative bodies sometimes
require “a majority of . . . members to be property owners, businesses [and] persons
having an interest in property in the district” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
See id. at 394-409 (describing the four broad categories of BID activities: physical
improvements, traditional municipal services, social services, and business-mentor pro-
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significantly according to both local needs and, importantly, available
resources. The larger, better-funded BIDs, such as Philadelphia’s Center
City and University City Districts, collaborate closely with local government officials and invest significant resources in a wide range of
quasi-governmental services. Both of these large BIDs hire their own
security forces, fund local infrastructure improvements and supplemental sanitation services, operate outreach programs for the homeless, promote local businesses, engage in advisory land-use planning
93
efforts, and sponsor special social and cultural events. In contrast,
some BIDs struggle to collect any revenue at all, even though they are
94
legally empowered to tax area property owners.
As a recent illuminating series of case studies of Philadelphia’s
BIDs illustrates, public-space management is the top priority of all
95
BIDs, large and small, rich and poor. Wealthier BIDs seek to accomplish this goal in more ambitious and resource-intensive ways. For example, the Center City District employs over one hundred individuals
who are charged with keeping sidewalks clean and clear of debris, as
well as a large cadre of Community Service Representatives who, among
other tasks, use special handheld devices to survey each block in the
BID boundaries to ensure that problems with public spaces are

grams); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Governing? Gentrifying? Seceding? Real-Time Answers to
Questions about Business Improvement Districts, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 35, 38-43 (2010) (warning
that “the closer that BIDs come—in structure and function—to general purpose local
governments, the more vulnerable they are to equal protection challenges.”).
93
See Göktuğ Morçöl, Center City District: A Case of Comprehensive Downtown BIDs, 3
DREXEL L. REV. 271, 279-81 (2010) (discussing the expansive current functions of the
Center City District, which include “transportation, land-use planning, streetscape and
infrastructure improvements, social services for the homeless, and operation of a community court”); Thomas J. Vicino, New Boundaries of Urban Governance: An Analysis of
Philadelphia’s University City Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 350-51 (2010)
(examining the budget for the University City district, as well as the different types of
activites funded by it, including infrastructure improvements and public safety initiatives); CENTER CITY PHILA., http://www.centercityphila.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
(listing news events, as well as office, retail, and residential space advertisements); UNIV.
CITY DIST., http://www.universitycity.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing information regarding restaurants, activities, accommodations, community service, and other events and listings).
94
See Garnett, supra note 92, at 41 (arguing that “[m]any of Philadelphia’s BIDs appear to be fairly anemic institutions that have difficulty collecting assessments at all”).
95
See generally Symposium, Business Improvement Districts and the Evolution of Urban
Governance, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 109-372 (2010).
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promptly addressed. Some of the Community Service Representatives are part of a specially trained Homeless Action Team which seeks
to “get the homeless off downtown streets and into safe environments
97
The Center City District, in
with any necessary social services.”
collaboration with the University City District, even runs a court that
addresses quality-of-life offenses and assigns offenders to community
98
service. Both have also invested millions of dollars in street lighting,
99
beautification, and other public infrastructure improvements. While
BIDs with limited resources find it difficult to accomplish anything at
all, public-space management efforts of a far more basic and mundane nature remain their top, and often only, priority. Philadelphia’s
Germantown Special Services District, for example, has effectively no
budget—having long since given up on collecting the special assessments owed by local property owners—but does what it can to remove
100
trash from neighborhood parks and sidewalks.
C. The Public-Space Management Compromise
Taken together, order-maintenance policing and BIDs can be
understood as reflecting a compromise between proponents like Hardin, who believe coercive government regulation represents the only
means to prevent overuse of open-access resources, and neoclassical
economists like Demsetz, who understand privatization as the solution
to the same problem. Over the last few decades, police officers have
101
reassumed regulation of conduct by public-space appropriators. Po96

Safe: Community Service Representatives, CENTER CITY PHILA., http://centercityphila.org/
about/CSRs.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
97
Id. As I have previously written, these homeless-relocation efforts represent a
common, and controversial, public-space-management technique. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1085-88 (2005) (explaining that much
of the controversy centers on the perception that these services work to keep the homeless out of the sight of the other members of the community).
98
Morçöl, supra note 93, at 281.
99
Beautiful: Overview, CENTER CITY PHILA., http://www.centercityphila.org/about/
Beautiful.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
100
See Garnett, supra note 92, at 46 (describing an “experiment” performed by the
Germantown Special Services District, through which it confirmed that the Philadelphia
Parks Department is slow to respond to complaints about the accumulation of trash in
Germantown parks).
101
See KELLING & COLES, supra note 9, at 148-56 (discussing policing tactics employed in New York City in the 1990s and commenting positively on the reclamation of
public space brought about by those tactics).
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lice use a variety of devices to accomplish this task. Some strategies—
102
for example, aggressive misdemeanor arrests —are more Leviathanesque than others—for example, community policing. At the same
time, new sublocal institutions like BIDs have vested private property
owners with the power to coercively raise the funds needed to maintain public spaces. BIDs clearly reflect an understanding that property
owners are better situated than occasional public-space appropriators
(and even renters) to make decisions about public-space management.
But BIDs do not go so far as to invest owners with any of the other traditional tools of management that attend private ownership—or even
“liberal commons” or “governance property” regimes—such as the
right to exclude outsiders and establish formal governance rules.
There is little question that fiscal constraints may force local governments to scale back these strategies. This reality is most clear in the
policing context, where massive budget cuts and resulting reductions
in the police force in urban police departments undoubtedly place
pressure on personnel- and resource-intensive strategies, including
103
But the fiscal constraints on
order-maintenance policing efforts.
BIDs and other quasi-privatization efforts in cities are real: because
BID assessments are frequently keyed to property values, their ability
to raise revenue through special assessments fluctuates along with the
104
Business owners are also more likely to approve
real estate market.
additional assessments in better economic times and, as discussed below, are unlikely to do so when property values are depressed. And
because BIDs depend on revenue raised through debt and upon state
and local transfer payments, the looming cloud of state and municipal
105
Anecdotally, the dissoluinsolvency also limits available resources.
102

See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 71, at 6-10 (analyzing the effects of “broken
windows policing,” Mayor Giuliani’s aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy); Corman &
Mocan, supra note 71, at 259-61 (same); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 71, at 287-300
(same).
103
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
104
See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 83, at 389-94.
105
For examples of the challenges facing the state and municipal levels, see Jon
Hilsenrath & Neil King Jr., Bernanke Rejects Bailouts: Fed Chief Says State and Local Governments Shouldn’t Expect Federal Loans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8-9, 2011, at A2. See also Tracy
Gordon, Buy and Hold (On Tight): The Recent Muni Bond Rollercoaster and What It Means for
Cities 2-5 (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/
papers/2011/0919_muni_bonds_gordon/0919_muni_bonds_gordon.pdf (noting that
“uncertainty remains” in the municipal bond market after the financial crisis, but that
“widespread municipal bankruptcies and defaults have not come to pass”); Richard
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tion of a handful of BIDs throughout the United States reflect these
106
realities, but many other BIDs undoubtedly are struggling financially.
III. THE FUTURE OF URBAN COMMONS MANAGEMENT
If the current financial constraints on local governments prove to
be short lived, the urban commons compromise may well emerge
unscathed. However, given the structural impediments to state and
municipal fiscal reform—notably, pension obligations and labor
107
relations —the current financial constraints may persist, even if the
Posner, State and Local Government: The Fiscal Crisis, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 19,
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/12/state-and-local-governmentthe-fiscal-crisisposner.html (maintaining that the financial crisis “caused a sharp decline
in state tax revenues, which [were] 12 percent below their pre-downturn levels,” and
discussing different proposals to ameliorate the situation).
106
See, e.g., Michael Clark, Atlantic City Special Improvement District Dissolves, PRESS
ATLANTIC CITY (N.J.), Apr. 18, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 765521 (describing the
dissolution of a nineteen-year-old BID in Atlantic City and the subsequent transfer of
assets to the state’s Casino Reinvestment Plan Authority); David Garrick, Escondido: City
Eliminates Downtown Merchant Fees, N. COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Sept. 16, 2011,
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/Escondido/article_9333c90a_a8ee_5fff_9a7b_
89b1cfd2a6667.html (reporting on the dissolution by the City Council of Escondido of
a twenty-two-year-old BID due to economic woes). The financial pressures on TIF districts, which rely directly on property taxes and municipal bonds backed by them, are
even more severe. See Kay James, Dells Officials Told City’s TIF Districts Short of Repaying
City for Bonds, PORTAGE DAILY REG. (Wis.), Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.wiscnews.com/
portagedailyregister/news/article_42f37c7a-c860-11df-9db2-001cc4c002e0.html?mode=
story (reporting on a TIF district’s inability to repay its municipal bonds and averaging
the city’s debt at nearly $20,000 per resident); Joseph Ruzich, Riverside Considers Raising
Taxes, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 4 (noting that the failure of a TIF plan resulted in calls
to raise taxes on businesses and residents); Elisha Sauers, City Needs to Borrow Another
$10M, CAPITAL (Md.), May 20, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 10113020 (characterizing the
$2 million in payments Annapolis owes to its TIF custodian as a “crushing expense”).
107
See, e.g., Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial
& Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 41 (2011) (statement of
Joshua Rauh, Associate Professor of Finance, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) (“Using valuations consistent with financial economics, . . . the
already-promised part of these unfunded liabilities actually amounts to over $3 trillion.”); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 388 (2010) (explaining how those structural impediments can be
overcome with the help of state intervention); see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE
WIDENING GAP: THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON STATE PENSION AND RETIREE
HEALTH CARE COSTS 1-2 (2011), available at http://pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedfiles/Pew_Pensions_retiree_benefits.pdf (estimating that unfunded state
pension liabilities as of, in most cases, June 2009, were between $1.26 and $2.4 trillion
depending on the discount rate applied, an increase of 26% over the previous
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economy fully recovers in relatively short order. Thus, this is
an opportune time to consider whether, where, and how effective
regulation of the urban commons may arise with limited government
intervention.
A. Increased Privatization
More extensive privatization represents one possible response to
the fiscal limitations facing local governments. Even the complete
privatization of public spaces is not unprecedented. Salt Lake City
transferred title of Temple Square, its city’s central public square, to
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in 1999; the transfer—
and the Church’s subsequent imposition of rules of conduct governing
108
visitors to the square—spawned significant controversy. Similar, less
celebrated transfers occur on a relatively routine basis as part of
109
“development agreements” between cities and private developers. As
Ellickson has observed, Laredo, Texas, and municipalities in St. Louis
County, Missouri, routinely privatize street segments to enable home110
owners to set up street associations empowered to levy assessments.
year); Girard Miller, Benefits, Bankruptcy, and Baloney, GOVERNING (July 8, 2010),
http://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/state-retiree-Benefits-Bankruptcy-andBaloney.html (“Retirees’ claims would be the most difficult benefits to set aside in a
municipal bankruptcy . . . .”); Mary W. Walsh, A Path is Sought for States to Escape Debt
Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A1 (discussing structural and political constraints,
including insolvent state pension funds, preventing states and local governments from
declaring bankruptcy as a way to solve their financial difficulties).
108
The city initially retained a public easement for the surface that expressly
empowered the Church to restrict access of anyone “engaging in any illegal, offensive,
indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct.” First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2002). The Tenth
Circuit invalidated this restriction on First Amendment free-speech grounds, reasoning
that the reservation of the easement preserved the status of the encumbered property
as a public forum upon which it could not limit speech. Id. at 1131-34. Subsequently,
the City transferred the easement to the Church; a challenge to that transfer on Establishment Clause grounds was rejected. Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425
F.3d 1249, 1258-61 (10th Cir. 2005).
109
See John C. Crees, Note, The Right and Wrong Ways to Sell a Public Forum, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1419, 1435-39 (2009) (providing examples of issues that prevent municipalities
from privatizing public fora). In development agreements, a developer and local government agree to a negotiated package of regulatory and development concessions in
order to streamline a development process. Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voice: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions (pt. 1), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22 (2005).
110
Ellickson, supra note 19, at 91.
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And, of course, millions of Americans voluntarily live in planned residential communities where commons spaces are privately owned and
governed by residential community associations.
Economist Robert Nelson has proposed the wide-scale adaptation of
111
residential community associations to urban neighborhoods. Nelson
asserts that the benefits and effectiveness of this “liberal commons”
model greatly surpass those of government regulation: enabling urban
communities to secure these advantages could dramatically improve the
112
Nelson’s privatization proquality of life in urban neighborhoods.
posal is quite radical, as it includes a transfer of the right to exclude
113
outsiders to property owners. As he colorfully observes,
Many inner city residents would like to exclude criminals, hoodlums, drug
dealers, truants, and others who often undermine the possibilities for a
peaceful and vital neighborhood existence. . . .
There is no physical or other practical reason why an inner city neighborhood could not become a gated neighborhood. . . .
. . . Inner city neighborhoods should have the right to establish land
use and other controls, including building neighborhood walls, if neces114
sary, to maintain neighborhood quality.

Ellickson’s proposal for Block Improvement Districts (BLIDs) is
more modest. Ellickson shares Nelson’s concerns that urban residents—especially the residents of poor, inner-city neighborhoods—are
systematically disadvantaged by their inability to overcome collective
action problems and that some steps toward privatization would help
these residents to organize in order to better address neighborhood
115
problems, including the maintenance of urban public spaces. Ellickson’s proposed BLIDs, however, more closely approximate BIDs for
residential communities than the residential community associations
111

See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 301-03 (2005) (proposing that if owners of housing in inner-city
areas created what he terms “Neighborhood Associations in Established Neighborhoods,” then they “might well experience a large increase in their individual wealth”);
Nelson, supra note 19, at 866 (suggesting that urban community associations may help
security).
112
Nelson, supra note 19, at 866.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 865-67.
115
See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 92-95, 97-98 (explaining how the proposed BLID
entities would be structured, the incentives-based logic behind their structure, and
some suggested functions with which they would be entrusted).
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and gated communities championed by Nelson. For example, Ellickson argues that BLIDs should concentrate primarily on supplemental
116
public services; he questions Nelson’s more expansive proposal, instead suggesting that most BLIDs should have only limited regulatory
117
authority over private land-use controls.
Additional privatization might well improve the efficiency of urban
public-space governance, result in more orderly public spaces, and
even increase residents’ quality of life. It would also, however, raise a
host of philosophical, practical, and legal difficulties. Philosophically,
both residential community associations and BIDs have been the subject of extensive controversy, with critics asserting, among other things,
that these institutions are illiberal (because they privilege property
ownership) and exacerbate existing economic disparities between
118
wealthy and poor communities. Extending the model as far as Nelson suggests would increase those concerns and would raise additional
ones—especially the implications of formally closing the public-space
commons. As Carol Rose has argued, there is a long tradition in
Anglo-American law of protecting certain public spaces from privatization precisely because they are “most valuable when used by indefinite
119
and unlimited numbers of persons—by the public at large.”
Practically, privatization poses a complex institutional design prob120
lem.
It would also likely require state-enabling legislation, the enactment of which would involve a host of public choice difficulties.
Moreover, the current situation in the real estate market, with large
percentages of American property owners “underwater” on their
121
mortgages, likely dramatically reduces the attractiveness of privatization as a commons governance device. The depressed real estate mar-

116

See id. at 97 (suggesting that a BLID’s articles of incorporation should authorize
the provision of services on the “life safety,” “sanitation,” and “beautification” fronts).
117
Id. at 97-100.
118
Robert B. Reich, Secessssion of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
119
Rose, supra note 8, at 774.
120
To begin, consider the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the privatized
space and the appropriate universe of “owners” of this space.
121
See, e.g., Mamta Badkar, The 13 States Still Drowning in Underwater Mortgages, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/12-states-with-mortgagesunderwater-q3-negative-equity-2011-11; Half of Commercial Mortgages to Be Underwater:
Warren, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/36085517/Half_of_Commercial_
Mortgages_to_Be_Underwater_Warren.
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ket both diminishes the likelihood that owners would agree to financing new public services voluntarily through special assessments and the
likelihood that they would have the resources available to pay those
special assessments if imposed.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are significant legal
barriers to privatizing the urban commons. The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits, in most cases, the allocation of voting rights by property ownership; therefore, a law investing property with the powers of
exclusion and governance over public spaces would be constitutionally
suspect. Indeed, courts rejecting one-person, one-vote challenges to
BIDs’ governance structures have specifically relied on the fact that
122
Although
BIDs do not exercise formal “governmental” authority.
privatization via complete transfer of public spaces to private individuals presumably would not raise Equal-Protection voting concerns, some
courts have expressed First Amendment anxieties over the potential
123
closure of a public forum.
B. Cooperative Management of the Urban Commons
Assuming that increased privatization is unlikely, it becomes necessary to explore whether, and under what circumstances, cooperative
management of the urban commons is possible. There are many reasons for pessimism about these questions. After all, a primary catalyst
for the public-space-management devices described above was dismay
over the apparent chaos reigning in unregulated public spaces.
Moreover, the likelihood of cooperative management of the urban
124
Urban public spaces have
commons ought to be particularly low.
few of the characteristics that Ostrom linked with successful commonpool resource-management regimes. Despite these formidable obstacles, many urban communities successfully manage their sidewalks and
parks with very little government intervention.
Insight into why—and where—these successes arise can be found
in multiple academic disciplines. The legal literature pays a great deal
122

See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding that a BID’s responsibility for its core functions was secondary to the city’s and
thus it did not have sufficient authority to constitute a governmental entity).
123
See Crees, supra note 109, at 1436-39 (discussing case law in which courts have
struggled to balance property rights in newly privatized land, and the residual rights of the
public to free expression, based on easements retained by local governments after sale).
124
See supra Section I.A.
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of attention to the role of informal social norms as rules of conduct in
125
Shared norms were among Ostrom’s
the regulation of commons.
126
predictors of successful commons management.
Logically, when
other predictors are not present, norms become particularly important. Any minimally observant person understands that norms play
a dominant role in managing common spaces. To borrow from an
example that I have used elsewhere, I retrieve my recycling bins from
the end of the driveway, remove my children’s toys from the yard, and
shovel snow from my sidewalk, not because I am under a legal obligation to do so (although I undoubtedly am), but because the norms in
127
my neighborhood require it. These norms are actually quite nuanced:
tricycles are routinely tolerated on the sidewalk, but larger bicycles and
wagons are not; on the morning after a heavy snow, it is acceptable to
shovel only a small path before leaving for work, but it is expected that
the remaining snow will be cleared promptly at the end of the workday; and neighbors allow a one-day grace period for retrieving the recycling bin, after which the gossip begins. As Ellickson has argued,
private norms are frequently the superior regulatory mechanism for
public spaces; legal rules—such as those codified in many ordermaintenance policies or those in Ellickson’s hypothetical public-space
zoning regime—represent second-best alternatives when informal
128
regulatory mechanisms fail.
Of course, informal regulatory mechanisms frequently do fail,
either because antisocial, rather than positive, norms are dominant in
a community, or because community members find it difficult to organize and enforce positive social norms (or both). This threat of regulatory failure is why the order-maintenance literature focuses extensively
129
on whether government intervention can shift norms. It is also why
125

See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 191-208 (1991) (discussing how the practices of high-seas whalers in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries“powerfully illustrate how nonhierarchical
groups can create welfare-maximizing substantive norms”).
126
See supra Section I.A.
127
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Private Norms and Public Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
183, 185-86 (2009).
128
See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1243-46 (inquiring into whether “city hall” or “civil
society” is a better candidate for managing the norms of public spaces).
129
See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2479-81 (1997) (supporting policing theories that keep valuable
and fragile social support networks intact); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action,
and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1527-30, 1535-38 (2002) (contrasting
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so many order-maintenance policies seek to overcome obstacles to informal community organization in order to catalyze private efforts to
130
control our urban public spaces.
Norms are a necessary, but not sufficient, input into successful
collective action. Successful informal management of the urban
commons requires both positive social norms of public-space appropriation and a high level of social capital, which Robert Putman classically refers to as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
131
trustworthiness that arise from them.” Communities that have access
to these two important inputs also have the ability to organize informally to address local problems, including the management of the urban commons. In sociological terms, these communities have high
132
levels of “collective efficacy.” It is hardly a surprise that communities
with high levels of collective efficacy are safer, more orderly, and more
133
socially cohesive than those with low levels of collective efficacy. All
this, in a sense, is a fancy way of stating the obvious. It is hardly surprising that socially cohesive communities find it easier to get organized
and address neighborhood problems like management of the urban
commons. The difficulty is that, for a host of reasons, many urban
communities are not socially cohesive. Moreover, these reasons tend
authoritarian policing, which alienates the citizenry, with “New Community Policing,”
which builds consensus and support for law and order); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for
Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1612-19 (2002) (retelling how police officers
and religious leaders worked to hold prayer vigils and providing a model for publicprivate alliances); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 812 (1998) (“Law enforcement policies should
have as a goal the promotion of social organization . . . .”).
130
However, even the latter actually may rely upon coercive government enforcement of positive social norms. See Garnett, supra note 127, at 193-98 (suggesting that
community policing efforts depend upon norm enforcement rather than norm entrepreneurship).
131
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000). Social capital is the subject of a voluminous and
somewhat contentious literature, and Putnam’s formulation is itself contested by other
social scientists. See, e.g., DAVID HALPERN, SOCIAL CAPITAL 1-40 (2005) (reviewing literature on the topic). Putnam’s “lean and mean” formulation, however, suffices here.
132
See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997) (defining collective efficacy as “social
cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of
the common good”).
133
See id. at 923 (finding a correlation among collective efficacy, intensity of local
social ties, and social organizations, level of neighborhood services, and low violent
crime rates).
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to have feedback effects on one another: disorder in public spaces
increases residents’ fear of victimization, residents who fear victimization are less likely to leave their homes to enter the public square and
interact with their neighbors, and residents who do not know their
neighbors are unlikely to trust and collaborate with them in order to
134
address neighborhood problems.
The trick is to identify the conditions that interrupt this cycle
of dysfunction, then enable neighbors to coordinate their normenforcement efforts among themselves. Here, the insights of urban
sociologists prove particularly useful. Sociologists point to a number
of factors that predict relatively high levels of collective efficacy, even
in the face of demographic factors that tend to suppress it. To begin,
collective efficacy increases as average residential tenure and levels of
135
homeownership increase.
For all of the reasons discussed above,
homeowners have significant financial incentives to address neighborhood problems. It seems reasonable to assume that residential stability
probably increases the likelihood that neighbors will get to know, and
136
grow to trust, one another. Longer-term residents have incentives to
address issues of public-space management, as well, since the problems
attendant to mismanagement affect their daily quality of life. Thus,
long-term residents (and especially homeowners) are more likely than
short-term residents to behave responsibly like “owners” of urban
public spaces.
In addition to residential tenure, other neighborhood structural
factors may influence levels of collective efficacy and, therefore, the
possibility of an effectively managed urban commons. Land use patterns also apparently influence the likelihood of cooperative commons
management. Contrary to the now-popular view of Jane Jacobs (who
137
extolled the virtues of mixed private land use), there is evidence that
mixed-land-use neighborhoods have lower levels of collective efficacy

134

See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 129-40 (discussing the effects of the “fear of crime”
phenomenon as well as ways in which order-maintenance policies have attempted to
alleviate it).
135
See Sampson et al., supra note 132, at 921.
136
Homeownership similarly increases the length of residential tenure since the
transaction costs of moving are significantly higher for owners than for renters.
137
See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 46 (1961)
(“Stores, bars, and restaurants, as the chief examples, work in several different and
complex ways to abet sidewalk safety.”).
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than do exclusively residential neighborhoods. Compared to inhabitants of exclusively residential blocks, those on blocks with commercial land uses report that they know their neighbors less well and are
less likely to trust them to intervene in a neighborhood problem; they
also feel that they themselves have less control over neighborhood
139
events. The reasons are not entirely clear, but it may be that the foot
traffic generated by commercial land uses impedes residents’ ability to
140
Commercial land
determine who “belong[s]” in their community.
use also increases the likelihood that strangers, including deviant ones,
141
will cross porous neighborhood boundaries. While longer residential
tenure is an important predictor of collective efficacy, even short-term
residents have a higher stake in maintaining the public space in their
community than do strangers, who are unlikely to share local norms of
conduct and are more likely to behave irresponsibly, as they have no
longer-term interest in neighborhood health.
At a more micro level, the architectural literature on “defensible
space” suggests that building design can increase positive feelings of
territoriality and encourage residents to assert ownership over public
spaces. The catalyst for this literature was Oscar Newman’s classic
study of the design of public housing projects. Newman argued that,
by enabling informal monitoring of public spaces, certain architectural
142
features of housing projects could reduce crime rates. Subsequently,
many urban planners and architects—including, most recently, the
self-styled “new urbanists”—have urged greater integration of these

138

See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 64-67 (discussing literature that calls Jacobs’s
assertions into question).
139
See, e.g., Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: A Comparison
of Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods, 5 POPULATION & ENV’T 141, 149-54 (1982) (correlating commercial land use and
crime rates); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Street Blocks with More Nonresidential Land Use Have
More Physical Deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 120,
121-22 (1995) (explaining that nonresidential uses remove residents that could have
helped manage the block and introduces strangers to the area).
140
RALPH B. TAYLOR, HUMAN TERRITORIAL FUNCTIONING 185 (1988); see also id.
(arguing that commercial land use arrangements “can create ‘holes’ in the fabric of
resident-based territorial control” and “gaps in the residents’ territorial control”).
141
See, e.g., Greenberg et al., supra note 139, at 161 (attributing lower crime rates in
certain neighborhoods to their lower “flow of outsiders”).
142
See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN
DESIGN 5-11 (1972) (illustrating architectural features that enable surveillance by nearby residents of semipublic spaces).
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features into both public and private redevelopments, as well as land
143
use regulations.
The policy implications of these two land-use factors are unclear.
As I have discussed in detail in previous work, there are high costs
associated with excluding commercial land uses from urban neighborhoods, including a reduction in the vitality of city life that is attrac144
tive to some would-be residents.
The costs of mandating certain
architectural requirements through land use regulations also are quite
high, and include a risk that increased building costs will dampen in145
As a predictive matter, however,
vestment in urban developments.
an understanding of the features correlated with a likelihood of successful commons management is a valuable planning tool for city officials in a world of limited resources.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A CROSS-COMMONS PERSPECTIVE
Like the fisheries and water systems that were the focus of
Ostrom’s classic work, the urban commons is a precious resource for
city dwellers. It is also, like all open-access resources, vulnerable to
exploitation. That exploitation, however, is not inevitable. This Article
has sought to illustrate that the urban commons need not descend
into tragedy—even at times when resources for coercive government
regulation are in short supply. As Ostrom’s account teaches, however,
not all common pool resources can be managed cooperatively. Thus,
this Article might be seen as an extension of her efforts to identify the
preconditions for successful commons management. In fact, experience with the urban public commons suggests that Ostrom’s account
may be overly pessimistic—that, at least with respect to open-access
resources with fixed locations (e.g., streets and sidewalks), cooperative
management without excessive propertization is possible.
An important next step, beyond the scope of the current inquiry,
would be an analysis of these preconditions that extends beyond the
urban commons. For example, it would be useful to consider whether
143

See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039
(2002) (applying Newman’s theory that architecture, urban design, and legal or emotional ownership of real estate can decrease crime rates).
144
See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 90-100 (arguing that urban areas should use zoning to highlight the benefit of living in an urban environment).
145
See id. at 180-88 (using Milwaukee and Chicago as examples evidencing the relationship between regulators and developers).
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the preconditions and policies for successful management of the
urban commons also predict the successes and failures of commons
that are not fixed, physical spaces. In the context of intellectual property and the digital commons, for example, scholars have engaged in
extensive debate over issues similar to those raised in this Article.
Some scholars champion the possibility of cooperative commons man146
agement and question whether creative content has become “overpropertized.”147 Others claim that strong intellectual property rights
148
are necessary to guarantee innovation. Still others call for additional
149
regulation of digital content on the Internet. Although a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, given the
substantial overlap in the themes characterizing these debates, a crosscommons analysis of policy innovations in the two very different domains could yield important insights about the problem of the commons generally.

146

Lawrence Lessig argues that the Internet fits squarely within Carol Rose’s view
that “some kinds of property . . . should be open to the public.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 86 (2001)
(quoting Rose, supra note 8, at 713). According to Professor Lessig, the Internet was
built upon two kinds of commons, and moved into a third, which resulted in an “increase [in] the value of controlled resources by connecting them with free resources.”
Id. at 85. He also advances several reasons why he believes the commons of the Internet should be regulated. See id. at 85-99. For an excellent, recent discussion of this
problem, see Michael J. Madison et. al, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010), and the responses included in the volume.
147
See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF
THE MIND 179-204 (2008); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 23-48
(2008)
148
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-27 (2011)
(discussing this debate and outlining a defense of intellectual property); Peter S. Mennell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 36
(discussing the property rights debate in intellectual property).
149
See, e.g., David F. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Web Sites, WASH. POST
(Jan. 18, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-toshut-down-web-sites/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html (discussing various websites
that protested proposed Internet privacy regulations).

